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Abstract 
Over the last decade, numerolls ethnic violence occurred i n  southern p hail and, i n  
llrlrticular three provinces near Thailand-Malaysia border that consist of Yaln, Pattnni 
~ l v d  Narnthiioat. This civil disturbance might threaten the sovereignty ofthe state and 
~llrillen~e the eflectiveness ~ n d  management ofthegovernment. It can also hinder the 
~'~.onomicdezrelo~~nent i)z this area. Some of theproblem are ca~ised by misinterpretation 
" f  r~olitiral history betweal the government atzd the people in this locality. A t  the same 
t r r r l c :  n deep serzse ofMuslim-Malay had beer1 implanted i n  m a i - M u s l i m  zvhile Thai- 
.\1lcslim iglzores patriotism ofi7mi. Another nspect ofthe problem is that thegovenznrent 
~'"licics are not appropriate and incl14sive especially education policy, economic 
i~r'~~c.lopment and resources rnnnagerl~ellt in the local comlnunity. O n e  of the most 
;"c'ssillg cotlcerns ofall is that thegoverllment misunderstatzds the culture ofthepeople 
"' lllis regiotl and has the benefit o f the  state budget; therefore, this has been a serious 
r ' " ' ~ ~ l ~ m  nnd conflict betzveen the state and locnl resident for m a n y  years. If the 
S"i'~'r~lnlent has repeatedly ignored understanding of a deep root ofproblenr and 
.'l'llropriated resol~itio?l has ?lot been applied, this zliolence disturbntzce iuill persistsfor 
'1~11,y tifrle. 
I. Introduction 
The current wave of violence in Southern Thailand began in January 200q 
that the Thaksin government separated three provinces in southern Thailarld, 
namely, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat under martial law following a well. 
coordinated attack on army and police facilities and a number of state-run 
schools. In April 2004, armed groups built a series of coordinated attacks on 
security check points which resulted in the army killing more than 100 of the 
attackers, including some who took sanctuary in the Kreu-Se mosque. 0, 
October 25, 2004, Thai troops killed nine protesters at  Tak Bai, tensions 
developed in the region when another 80 suffocated after being piled into 
army trucks. Bombings and killings have become daily fare, and no clear 
resolution is in sight. 
11. Historical Grievances 
The Thai government, under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, had 
for several years refused that separatist activity was happening in southern 
Thailand, despite slowly rising levels of violence, but now has been forced to 
concede publicly that the case. Thailand is place to four million Musiirns areal 
actively small population amidst some 60 million Thais the huge majority of 
whom are Malay speakers living in the southern provinces (Smit, 2004).Thai 
officials have taken great care not to label the violence as "Islamic" in an effort 
to maintain coru~nunity relations. The Muslims of southern Thailand are 
mostly ethruc Malays and speak Malay, rather than Thai. They were once part 
of an independent sultanate of Patani, comprising the present-day provinces 
of Pattani, Yala, Narathitvat, and parts of western Songkhla, that thrived from 
1390to 1902.That history as a separate political entity and the second-class 
status and political omit the Malay minority has borne ever since within 
independent Thailand, allows for the backdrop to the violence today. 
Siam, then known as Thailand, in 1902, formally incorporated the 
sultanate, a step reinforced in 1909 by an Anglo Siamese treaty that drew a 
border between Patani and the Malay states of Kelantan, Perak, Kedah and 
Perlis (in then British Malaya, now Malaysia). A series of Thai administrative 
reforms moved the Patani ruler and separated the sultanate into three 
provinces, Pattani, Yala and Narathilvat. The local aristocracy was deposed in 
favour of officials who spoke only Thai and reported exclusively and directly 
to Bangkok. 
The period of the twentieth century, relations between Bangkok and the 
majority Muslim southern provinces were described by harsh assimilation 
policies, resistance, conciliatory government gestures that were seldom 
properly implemented, and then an easing of tensions (Culp,2003). 
The factor of the southern problem is economic development. Large scale 
economical projects and plans are :usually all predetermined by the central 
g 
overnment without participation from the local people (The National 
Commission, 2006). The three southern provinces have been 
consistently among the poorest in the south region of Thailand as the following 
Table 1. 
Tzble 1 : The information of poverty in the southern provinces of 
Thailand from 2006-2009. 
Average percentage of pove 
(Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Developn~ent Board, 







111. The Changing Chxacter of the Violence 
Based on the database of Deep South Watch, during the 73 months from 
January 2004 to January 2010, there were a total of 9,446 incidents of unrest, 
resulting in roughly 4,100 deaths and 6,509 injuries. If the families of the death 
2nd the injured are included, an estimated 53,045 people were directly involved 
by the violence. While most Thai tends to assume that Buddhist fatalities 
w eed  those of Muslims, in fact the deaths of Muslims have outnumbered 
'host. of Buddhists, though the majority of those injured have been Buddhist. 
Statistics of Figure 1 show that 58.95 per cent (2,417) of the dead were Muslims, 
'~hile 36.02 per cent (1,559) were Buddhists. Among the injured, 59.82 per 
"nt (3,894) were Buddhists, while 32.17 per cent (2,094) were Muslims 
(Jitpirornsri, 2010). A close inspection of trends in violence over six-year period 
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in the region has fluctuated. There were 1,838 incidents in 2004, 2,173 
2005, 1,847 in 2006 and 1,850 in 2007. The number of incidents bri, 
decreased after 2007, with only 821 in 2008. In 2009, however, the case 
violent incidents grew to 1,035 (Figure 2). 
Figurel. Number of Deaths and Injuries by Religion 
(From January 2004-January 2010, there were a total of 10,609 casualties fror,, 
the unrest over 73 months) 
Y .  
Deaths Injuries 
Source.Jitpiromsri, 2010. Deep South Watch. 
Figruc 2.Diagram Comparing the Number of Incidents of Unrest (monthly 
(Pattani,Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla Provinces, 73 months, a total of 9,416 
incidents, January 2004-January 2010) 
So~rrce:Jitpirornsri, 2010. Deep South Watch. 
h When losses and casualty rates are considered, the violence can be 
'1 into three phases (Jitpiromsri and McCargo,2010). Phase one, from 
Q ?004 to 2007, showed a higher number of deaths and injuries; there was a 
w,ve-like pattern of incidents, fluctuating with alternating highs and lows, 
month after month. The most violent months were October 2004, with a total 
,f approximately 316 deaths and injuries, and June 2007, with approximately 
304 fatalities. There was a concentration of violence following the 19 September 
2006 military coup, in an apparent attempt to test the resolve of the security - 
forces. During the period from November 2006 to June 2007, during four 
months there were more than 200 deaths and injuries shown and in only one 
month were there less than 150deaths and injuries. 
During phase two, from July 2007 to the end of 2008, the situation became 
, different due to tactical adjustments by the state. In response to the gained 
following the 2006 coup, the military adopted the more aggressive 
,,Southern Territory Protection Plan", which took deploying troops to 
surround insurgent strongholds and capture militant leaders. When General 
Anupong Paochinda as the Commander of the Royal Thai Army (RTA) in late 
2007, he developed troop levels in the South under the control of the Internal 
Security Operations Command (ISOC), carrying the total number of security 
deployed in the region to approximately 60,000. This security-based 
approach underlined state actions, particularly by the military, to control and 
. maintain peace. Army regions from other parts of the country were established 
authority over the three southern border provinces. Local forces were further 
boosted by the establishment of more than thirty companies of pararnilitaries 
(tahan phran). Meantime, the Royal Thai Government, led by the Ministry of 
the Interior, added the number of territorial volunteers by approximately 2,000 
additional individuals, and the People's Force was set u p  by increasing the 
number of assistant village chiefs for peacekeeping from one per village to 
five per village. In a parallel move, the police established the Southern Border 
['atrol Police Operations Centre (SBPPOC). 
There are four groups still active today include: 1)BRN-C (Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional-coordinate, National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate) the only 
active faction of BRN, first established in the early 1960s to fight for an 
independent Patani state. Thought to be the largest and best organised of the 
armed groups, it is focused on political organising and recruitment within 
Islamic schools; 2) Pemuda, a separatist youth movement (part of which is 
controlled by BRN-C), believed to be responsible for a large proportion of 
day-to-day sabotage, shooting and bombing attacks; 3)GMlP  (Gerakan 
! Mujahidin Islam Patani, Patani Islamic Mujahidin Croup), established by 
Afghanistan veterans in 1995, committed to an independent Islamic state; and 
4, Nflu PULO, established in 1995 as an offshoot of PULO and the smallest of 
active armed groups, is fighting for an independent state. 
u o y x s  3!qde~%oj~e-~ s u o g e ~ a d o  2u!d~ay 
l u a ~ l e d a a  BOOZ LenmI SNOILVN a3UNfl I 'AaX ESBE 'ON dgI4 
IV. The Resolution of Conflict 
The government established a new strategy emphasizing increased public 
participation, economic development and a broad amnesty, which hundreds 
of communist  and  separatist  f ighters took up, when  General P rem 
Tinasulan~nd took office in 1980. Prem was himself a southerner and had 
served in the Fourth Army there, so he had a much better 
understanding of the identi ty politics and  local grievances than h i s  
predecessors (International Crisis Group,2005). 
He found a new administrative system to  coordinate a shift from 
confrontation to negotiat ion.  A Civil-Police Military joint 
h e a d q u a r t e r ~ ( ~ ~ ~ 4 3 ) ,  establish to coordinate security operations, was under 
strict orders to assure that extra-judicial killings and disappearances ceased. 
Moreover, the government established a Policy of Attraction, purposed at 
drawing off sympathy from separatist groups by gaining political participation 
and developing economic sector projects on the region. 
The government established several large infrastructure schemes and 
brought electricity and running water to remote areas. Military personnel and 
pvernment officials aided set u p  committees at the village level to promote 
economic development and security. Political matters were managed by a new 
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC), found in 1981 
and initially under the Fourth Army Region commander, later the interior 
minister, but whose board admitted many locals. There was an stress on 
understanding Malay Muslim culture, so training was supplied for non-Malay 
officials in cultural awareness and the local Patani Malay (known by Thais as 
Jawi) language. 
In 2004, the Thai government took to develop a concerted strategy for 
overcoming with the conflict in the South. Earlier in time, the central 
.ldministration inclined to describe unrest in Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat 
hecame an issue of law and order, but at the end of the problem, the situation 
became more serious. Between 2004 and 2006, the growing tempo and scale 
of violence forced government to face the reality that it looked an entrenched 
wparatist insurgency in the south and took action or strategy was needed. 
The extremely important key factor to find the h r s t  among them is making 
h e r  community relation. The dialogue can be applied with the leaders of 
'he Muslim community, Tok Gurus (Muslim clerics), and the leaders of the 
"illages to make smaller tension. This action brought about the confidence of 
police. military in term of the aiding investigations and give intelligence 
"'formation which could help prevent attacks. 
Moreover, in order to involve the Muslim community, the government 
''hould focus on the young Muslims. This action aims to give the same 
"l'portunity between Muslim youths and Buddhist youths. These actions, 
" " " ' e l ~ ~  opportunity in educational sector, job training promoting o r  
eventually becoming a government employee. Additionally, the major foQs 
of the government regulation in educational sector is base on Muslim 1 
fundamental. Accordingly, the  government policy pu t  more effort on 
establishing regulation to organize and support the Muslim school, Pondok 
in  term of budget, regulation and curriculum developing etc. including 
Wahabbi Islam School. Blanchard(2008)stated that Wahhabism is a puritanical 
form of Sunni Islam and is practiced in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, although it i, 
much less rigidly enforced in the latter. Moreover, Muslim villager must attain 
the training course organized by Thai Armed Force. 
Furthermore, the most important aspect for conflict resolution economca] 
development in this region is important aspect for codict resolution. Given the 
structural problems of economic development in the southern Thailand as action 01 
sllort term may have some symbolic effect on Thai population but will not develop 
the economic status in the south. For the long term, improving economic conditions 
are necessary to decrease the local potential for violent insurgency. 
The Royal Thai Government (RTG) should focus on the connection 
between cooperation and the policy of international economic in term of 
culture and political. Most of the policies have had a good results, namely, the 
construction of new deep sea port and land bridge project in the south, and 
road construction to combine the upper and lower South which support and 
enhance transportation. In a special economic zone (zone three) which a 
number of additional tax relief measures to encourage investment, the 
population should start invest in small entrepreneur such as promoting 
clothing factory in their villages, changing agriculture and sea food products 
for exporting. 
The RTG should consider changing its focus from the tourist indust~y 
and  entertainment towards the development and design a new product for 
agriculture and fishing products. As a consequence, the per capita income of 
people in this area will increase and will be promoting a range of industries. 
Finally, the RTG will involve authority to control allocating budgets in local 
development which propose for civilian investment in the future. 
V. Concluding Remark 
There are several factors causing the insurgency in Thailand for example 
history, political, economic, social, and education. The conflict resolution that 
the Thai Government has put more emphasis on is on soft power strategies, 
namely, improvement in political, economic, social and educational areas. The 
conflict resolution is presently focusing are dealing with local Muslim leaders 
to proactively identify and manage communal-religious tensions, prioritizing 
the development of economic in the Southern Thai. 
To solve the unfair judiciary system, the state should focus on "human 
security" rather than focusing o n  "national security" in order to protect human 
and freedom in this area. In addition, state officials should stop 
discriminate against the local people. The government should set u p  formal 
to investigate judicial processes. Finally, the problems in the South 
,hould be the notion of "living with differencesJ1 TheThai state and the general 
P ublic have to alter their ways of thinking and practice, to shift from an  
on maintaining the unity of the country or national security to a 
focus on human security, rights and freedom of its citizens. 
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